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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN
ATTORNEY’S WORK PRODUCT
RALPH D. CLIFFORD*
“Can you tell me,” asked Sir John, “how long it
took you to knock out that nocturne?”
“Two days,” replied Whistler.
“The labour of two days, then, is that for which
you ask two hundred guineas?”
“No,” replied Whistler, “I ask it for the
knowledge of a lifetime.”1

INTRODUCTION

This

paper addresses the main intellectual property
consequences of practicing law and whether attorneys can
prevent others from using their work-product. The article does
not assume that the reader is an expert in intellectual property
law; instead, it is designed to answer the types of questions
practitioners have about their rights.
There is one primary legal code that impacts attorneys’
rights to their work-product: the copyright law. 2 As a broad
* Professor of Law, S. New England School of Law. The author would like
to thank his colleague George Jacobs for his help with this paper and the
always helpful staff of the Law Library for helping find the materials needed
to produce this paper.
1
EDWARD PARRY, MY OWN WAY 40 (1932).
2
The current copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976, is found in Title
17 of the U.S. Code.
There is increasing controversy about whether another intellectual
property law system will become important to the practice of law – the patent
law. See Gary C. Bubb, Patented Tax Strategies – Are You Serious?, MASS.
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Aug. 6, 2007, at 47. Some law practice-related patents
have been issued. See Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity
Trusts Funded by Nonqualified Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790
(filed Dec. 1, 1999).
It is unclear if this type of patent will survive legal challenges to the
appropriateness of the patent. In In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2007), a patent was claimed on a method of imposing mandatory arbitration
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statement, copyright law protects how an author expresses
ideas. 3 It is the system that is used to prevent others from
copying a book, a movie, a musical composition, or even a
computer program.4 It is almost exclusively a federal statutory
remedy as comparable state protections have been preempted.5
As much of what an attorney does is expressing ideas in writing,
the copyright system is the most important method of protecting
an attorney’s work-product.
To clarify the discussion of copyright law and how it applies
to legal drafting, three hypotheticals will be used. In each of
these cases, the drafting attorneys may feel that their rights have
been or will be impinged.

within a legal document such as a contract. See id. at 1368. The claims were
ultimately rejected by the PTO as being obvious. See id. at 1370–71. When
this determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the
denial of the patent, but on grounds that call many legal practice patents into
question. See id. at 1371. The Court ultimately held that
[i]t is thus clear that the present statute does not allow
patents to be issued on particular business systems – such
as a particular type of arbitration – that depend entirely on
the use of mental processes. In other words, the patent
statute does not allow patents on particular systems that
depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a
field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress
intended to be beyond the reach of patentable subject
matter. Thus, it is established that the application of human
intelligence to the solution of practical problems is not in
and of itself patentable.
Id. at 1378–79. Under this standard, it is highly doubtful that the ‘790 patent
would be sustained if challenged in court.
3
See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989).
4
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
5
See id. § 301(a).
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I. HYPOTHETICALS
A.

The Brenda Maxim Hypothetical —
Litigation Work-Products

Brenda Maxim is a brilliant trial attorney in private practice.
One of her cases, the Applejack case, presented an issue of
whether the Rule Against Perpetuities was preempted by ERISA.
She drafted and filed a memorandum of law 6 that succinctly
defined both areas of law and argued that such preemption did
not occur. The judge was persuaded by the memorandum and
ruled in favor of Brenda’s client Applejack following the
reasoning Brenda had presented; indeed, the judge freely quoted
from Brenda’s memorandum without attributing the quotes to
her. Several months later, as Brenda was reading the week’s
case summaries, she saw a synopsis of a litigation in another
circuit that was based on the same law that had been decided in
Applejack. Out of curiosity, she went online using her legal
research service to read the new opinion. One of the options she
was presented with was to read the brief that had been submitted
to the court in the new case. She chose this option and found
that the brief had quoted most of the one she had submitted in
Applejack without attribution to her and certainly without her
permission. When she then looked up the Applejack case she
found that her brief had been loaded into the research system,
again without her consent.

6

The choice of a memorandum of law for this hypothetical is intentional
as it is generally seen as among the most creative of the litigation documents
an attorney prepares. See Davida H. Isaacs, The Highest Form of Flattery?
Application of the Fair Use Defense Against Copyright Claims for
Unauthorized Appropriation of Litigation Documents, 71 MO. L. REV. 391,
406–10 (2006). Other legal documents – the motion to dismiss rather than the
memorandum filed in support, for example – tend to be of such a set form
that finding the minimal creativity required by Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991), would be
impossible, or at least improbable. See Davida H. Isaacs, supra.
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B. The David Smith Hypothetical –
Transactional Work-Products
David Smith’s reputation as a transactional attorney matches
Brenda’s as a trial attorney.7 He drafted a complicated sale and
lease-back contract for one of his clients, Onetime Development
LLP, a major real estate developer. Several months later, when
representing another client, he was surprised to receive a
contract from the opposing attorney, Howard, that was an exact
copy of the Onetime contract with only the names, property
address and purchase and lease amounts changed. When asked,
Howard told David that his brother-in-law is the C.E.O. of
Onetime and had given him the contract. When David
questioned Howard about why Howard thought he could use the
contract that had been drafted by another attorney, Howard gave
him two answers: “Everybody does it,” and “Onetime paid for
the contract and gave me permission to use it.”
C. The Henry King Hypothetical –
Work-Products and Termination of
Representation
Henry King was retained by the Welbuilt Construction
Company to represent it in a variety of matters. After a falling
out between the parties, based in part on Welbuilt’s failure to
pay Henry’s bills, Welbuilt terminated Henry as its attorney.
Because of the nature of the representation, Henry has
developed a wide variety of legal documents, some completed
but others in various states of being drafted. Several days after
his representation was terminated, he received a demand from
Welbuilt’s new counsel that all documents being prepared be
turned over immediately.

7

The idea for this hypothetical came from Stanley F. Birch, Jr.,
Copyright Protection for Attorney Work Product: Practical and Ethical
Considerations, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255 (2003).
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II. HOW COPYRIGHT LAW WORKS
Copyright law is a system that protects the expression
contained within an author’s work without protecting the
underlying ideas and concepts that were expressed.8
Distinguishing between the two, the protectable
expression from the unprotectable idea, is not easy. As
Learned Hand stated in the leading precedent on the
difference:
Upon any work, . . . a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well,
as more and more of the incident is left out.
The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the [work] is
about, and at times might consist only of its
title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the [author] could
prevent the use of his ‘ideas’, to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never
extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix
that boundary, and nobody ever can. In some
cases the question has been treated as though it
were analogous to lifting a portion out of the
copyrighted work; but the analogy is not a
good one, because, though the skeleton is a
part of the body, it pervades and supports the
whole. In such cases we are rather concerned
with the line between expression and what is
expressed.9

8

See 17 U.S.C. § 102; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 (“Copyright does not
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the
author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical, graphic, or artistic form
in which the author expressed intellectual concepts.”).
9
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(citations omitted).
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As an example, consider Romeo and Juliet. On the idea
side of the dichotomy is the basic plot line of boy meets the
wrong girl and they both come to a tragic end. Any author is
free to write a story based on that idea.10 On the other side are
the actual words chosen by Shakespeare to tell his version of
the story. The words and other details of the telling would be
protected by the copyright.
Copyright in the United States is an automatic system. No
application for a copyright need be filed; instead, copyright
protection is automatic whenever a “work of authorship [is]
fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.”11 There are only
two requirements to obtain automatic copyright protection,
therefore: (1) that a “work of authorship” be created and (2)
that it is “fixed.” As fixation is the easier of the two requisites,
it will be discussed first.
A. Is an Attorney’s Work-Product “Fixed?”
In order for a work to be “fixed” under the Copyright Act,
it must be placed in some tangible form for more than a
transitory period. 12 When the three hypothetical attorneys
typed their respective work-products into their computer, or
dictated it on a tape or digital recorder, or wrote it out on
legal pads, the work would be considered fixed.13 With the
computer, the work is fixed in memory as it is typed in and
on the disk when it is saved. 14 Similarly, for the tape or
10

See, e.g., WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (1979); ARTHUR
LAURENTS, LEONARD BERNSTEIN, & STEPHEN SONDHEIM, WEST SIDE
STORY (1957).
11
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). The Copyright Act uses the word
“subsist” to describe the existence of a copyright. “Subsist” means “[t]o
exist . . . to remain or continue in existence.” AMER. HERITAGE DICT.
1791 (3d Ed. 1992).
12
See id. §§ 102(a) and 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium
of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration . . .”).
13
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B] (2007) [hereinafter “NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT “].
14
See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d
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digital recorder, it is fixed when the analog signals are
magnetically recorded by the tape recorder or when the
digital equivalents are stored in the memory of the digital
recorder.15 The legal pad fixes the work when the ink binds
with the paper substrate.16 For all of these methods, the
expression made can be observed again which establishes
fixation.
In contrast, if the attorneys merely thought of the words
or spoke them without recording them, no fixation would
have occurred. When words are thought or spoken, they
disappear and cannot be recaptured. 17 The copyright act
requires that the words that constitute the work be
“perceiv[able], reproduc[ible], or . . . communic[able]”18 for
fixation to have occurred. As words that are just spoken or
just conceived cannot be, fixation has not occurred.
Consequently, most of the work-product of an attorney is
fixed and has cleared the first hurdle towards copyrightability.
Certainly, the memorandum, contract, and other documents in
the three presented hypotheticals have been fixed.
B. Is an Attorney’s Work-Product a “Work of
Authorship?”
For a copyright to subsist, the creation must be a “work of
authorship.” Although Congress did not define “work of
authorship” in the Copyright Act, the legislative history
Cir. 1982) (holding that a video game was “fixed” in the memory chips of
the computer); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Arctic Intern., Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
15
See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986) (telecast of baseball game was
“fixed” as it was videotaped as it was broadcast).
16
See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Properties, Inc.,
322 F.3d 26, 31 & 35 n.4 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding copyright in
architectural drawings).
17
If the speech is being recorded, on the other hand, fixation might
occur. A good analogy for this is a radio broadcast. Without more–using
some form of recording device–once the broadcast completes it is no
longer possible to recapture the original broadcast. See 1 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B][2]. Consequently, it is not fixed.
18
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “fixed”).
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makes it clear that Congress intended to adopt the definition
that the courts had developed under earlier versions of the
copyright act.19 That definition requires that a work of
authorship:
be original to the author. Original, as the term
is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that
it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. The vast majority of
works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, “no matter how
crude, humble or obvious” it might be.20
Thus, a work that is created by its author rather than copied
and one that has some creativity within it21 will be
copyrighted as soon as it is fixed.22
19

See H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“The phrase ‘original works of authorship,’
which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without
change the standard of originality established by the courts under the
present copyright statute.”).
20
Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991). The definition in Feist carries over the definition that had been
established in earlier cases, see, e.g., The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884);
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), although
it has placed a different emphasis on the amount of creativity needed. See
Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A
Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 82
DENV.U. L. REV. 259, 262–70 (2004) [hereinafter “Clifford, Minimal
Creativity Standard”]. See generally, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A].
21
There is split of authority among the circuits about how much
creativity is sufficient, compare Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.
2003) (disallowing copyright in an artistic glass jellyfish sculpture) with
Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing copyright
in much simpler quilt design), and, for that matter, what creativity means.
For a full discussion of this issue, see Clifford, Minimal Creativity
Standard and Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the
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When examined under these requirements, much,
although not all, of the work-product of an attorney will
qualify for copyright. A detailed consideration of the two
requirements will differentiate between works that are
protectable and those that are not.
1. Do Work-Product Documents
Originate from the Attorney?
This requisite is typically satisfied when most documents
are created by an attorney. When the hypothetical attorneys
being discussed in this article created the documents, they
presumably decided on what words would best express the
concepts with which they were working. Whether through
keyboarding, dictation or longhand, these words were fixed
as required by the Copyright Act. Although nothing more
than this is required to satisfy this first requisite for
copyrightability, some further analytical examination is
necessary as some parts of the legal document may have been
copied from another work.
When Brenda wrote her brief in the Applejack case, for
instance, it is probable that she extracted some parts of it
from other attorneys or commercially available form books.23
It is very typical, after all, for the pro forma sections of a
brief to be reused in all of an attorney’s briefs.24 The original
author of these sections may not be the primary author of the
brief which would disallow any copyright claim25 or, even if
Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71
TUL. L.R. 1675 (1997).
22
See JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 914 (7th
Cir. 2007).
23
Such compilations of legal forms are generally considered to be
copyrightable, although the protection for any given form may not exist.
See Ross, Brovins & Oehmke, P.C. v. Lexis Nexis Group, a Div. of Reed
Elsevier Group, PLC, 463 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2006).
24
When a brief supporting the grant of summary judgment is drafted,
for example, the section of the brief that sets forth the standards used by
the court in evaluating whether the case is appropriate for summary
judgment is rarely custom-drafted; instead, the appropriate paragraphs are
used out of the attorney’s or a commercially available form bank.
25
The only possible claim would be as a “collective work,” see 17
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the brief author wrote the pro forma sections, the copyright
would be limited to a copyright in a derivative work which is
limited to any newly added material that contains sufficient
creativity to be considered original.26
This analysis is likely to be more limiting to David’s
ability to claim a copyright in his contract. Unlike briefs,
contracts have more provisions that do not differ significantly
from those found in any form book. 27 Much of a contract,
after all, is comprised of stock clauses 28 that do not differ
from contract to contract. Consequently, these prototype
sections of a contract rarely owe their origin to the drafting
attorney and would not be protected by a copyright.29 For the
sections of the contract that are not drafted using the legal
cookie cutter, on the other hand, and are custom drafted for
the particular contract in question, this first requisite is
satisfied.

U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “collective work”), although that type of
work is intended to be associated with such things as periodicals. As a
practical matter, however, the courts are unlikely to see the brief as a
compilation as there were no significant modifications made to the pro
forma sections of the brief. As a compilation, it is only the selection and
arrangement of the preexisting material that is protected. See 1 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 3.02. As the content and order of these pro forma
sections is always the same – a brief for summary judgment will set forth
the standards for granting the motion first, if the standards are addressed
at all – there is insufficient creativity to support the compilation copyright.
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340 (1991) (disallowing a copyright in the white pages of a phone book as
insufficient creativity is demonstrated).
26
See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01.
27
See Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027,
1029–30 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding attorney’s contract clauses “identical” to
those found in published form books).
28
Examples of such a clause include merger, choice of law, arbitration
and other similar clauses.
29
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499
U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
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2. Do Work-Product Documents
Contain Sufficient Creativity?
Unfortunately, determining whether a work has sufficient
creativity to be copyrighted is not simple as the circuits have
two different standards for how exceptional a work must be
before a copyright subsists. 30 In Feist, the Supreme Court
described the needed amount of creativity as “minimal” and
stressed that novelty was not required.31 Most circuits,32 the
Second being a good example, seem to have focused on the
word “minimal” and have not imposed strict standards for
creativity.33 Other circuits,34 with the Ninth being the leading
proponent, have ignored this warning and imposed potentially
onerous requirements before creativity will be found.35
Consequently, to determine if a work-product of an attorney
is protected, the alternate circuit standards must be
evaluated–the majority minimalist standard and the minority
high novelty standard.
30

Compare Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003)
(disallowing copyright in an artistic glass jellyfish sculpture) with Boisson
v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing copyright in much
simpler quilt design). See Clifford, Minimal Creativity Standard at 279–
80 (2004).
31
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.,
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
32
See CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d
1504 (1st Cir. 1996); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir.
2001); Masquerade Novelty, Inc., v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663
(3d Cir. 1990); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy
Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v.
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994), as modified 46
F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995); Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v.
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc.,
124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d
242 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
33
See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001).
34
See J. Thomas Distributors, Inc., v. Greenline Distributors, Inc.,
100 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 1996) (table, opinion at 1996 WL 636138); Stuart
Entertainment, Inc. v. American Games, Inc., 205 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir.
1999) (table, opinion at 1999 WL 1144831) (“we thus affirm on the basis
of the district court’s memorandum and ruling without further
discussion”); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
35
See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
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(a) The Creativity Required in a
Minimalist Jurisdiction
Most circuits have recognized how little creativity is
needed to meet the Feist requirement. For example, the
Second Circuit held that:
Originality does not mean that the work for
which copyright protection is sought must be
either novel or unique, it simply means a work
independently created by its author, one not
copied from pre-existing works, and a work
that comes from the exercise of the creative
powers of the author’s mind, in other words,
the fruits of the author’s intellectual labor.36
As the court applied this definition of originality, its focus
was on the intellectual choice-making in which the author
engaged. 37 For example, when the Boisson court examined
the layout of the letters on the alphabet quilt design in
question in the case, it determined that there was sufficient
creativity in their layout because there was a wide range of
possible layouts that could be used, only one of which was
chosen by the author. 38 As the court stated, “an author is
entitled to copyright protection for an independently
produced original work despite its identical nature to a prior
work, because it is independent creation, and not novelty that
is required.”39
Under this standard of creativity, most of the workproduct produced by the hypothetical attorneys would be
sufficiently creative for copyright protection to be available.
There are obviously many words that can be chosen to
express most legal concepts. By selecting from the choices,
36

Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
37
Cf. Clifford, Minimal Creativity Standards at 295–96.
38
See Boisson, 273 F.3d at 269.
39
Id. at 270.
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sufficient creativity for copyright protection is found.40 The
only expressions excluded in these jurisdictions would be
those copied from another, pre-existing source41 or one where
the author had no choices.42
(b) The Creativity Required in a
High Novelty Jurisdiction
Unfortunately, there is a minority of circuits that impose a
significantly higher hurdle before they will find sufficient
creativity.43 The Ninth Circuit in Satava v. Lowry,44 for
example, demanded a great deal of novelty before a work will
qualify for a copyright.45 In Satava, the court examined the
copyrightability of a glass jellyfish sculpture. 46 Despite the
holding in Feist that novelty was not required, 47 the Ninth
Circuit nevertheless required it.48
40

See id. See generally Clifford, Minimal Creativity Standards.
Boisson, 273 F.3d at 270–71. The pro forma sections on the
standards for granting summary judgment, for example, may well be
unprotectable if they are copied from a form book or other source.
42
See id. at 271. Where there is no choice among expressions, a
copyright lawyer would say that “merger” prevents a copyright from
being claimed. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are
thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred, since
protecting the ‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a
monopoly of the ‘idea’ upon the copyright owner free of the conditions
and limitations imposed by the patent law.”).
43
See Note 34, supra.
44
323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
45
See id. at 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (“expressions that are standard, stock,
or common to a particular subject matter or medium are not protectable
under copyright law.”). Cf. id. at 812 (“These elements are so
commonplace in glass-in-glass sculpture and so typical of jellyfish
physiology that to recognize copyright protection in their combination
effectively would give Satava a monopoly on lifelike glass-in-glass
sculptures of single jellyfish with vertical tentacles.”).
46
See id. at 807.
47
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a
work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so
long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”).
48
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810 (copyright was rejected as sculpture
was made of “standard, stock, or common” elements).
41
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If novelty rather than expressive choice is required,
significantly less of an attorney’s work-product will be
protected by copyright. In Brenda’s brief, for example, a
court would likely find that large sections of it are comprised
of “expressions that are standard, stock or common to a
particular subject matter.”49 As before, the pro forma
sections on the standards for granting summary judgment
would likely be unprotectable, 50 but unlike in minimalist
circuits, significantly more may be excluded from copyright
protection. In the discussion on the Rule Against Perpetuities
or ERISA in Brenda’s brief, much of what Brenda said would
be “common to [those] subject matter[s].” 51 As a
consequence, no protection would be available. This impact
is even more likely to affect the protection available to
David’s contract as contracts are even more limited in the
expression of their subject matter than briefs are.
(c) Where You Bring Suit Controls
The inescapable conclusion of the analysis is that where
you are (or, more accurately, where a suit for copyright
infringement is commenced)52 is going to control what rights
you have. In the high novelty circuits such as the Ninth, much
of what an attorney produces is likely to be found creatively
wanting and thus unprotectable. In most other circuits, the
opposite result is likely. Until the Supreme Court decides to
resolve the circuit split, 53 an attorney whose work is

49

Id. (emphasis added).
See note 41, supra.
51
See Satava, 323 F.3d at 810.
52
Personal jurisdiction in a copyright case is no different than most
other actions and is based on Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[C]. Venue, on the other
hand, has a specific statutory definition – a “district in which the
defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a)
(2000). Determining where someone can be “found” is often less than
simple. See generally 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[D].
53
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Satava v. Lowry. 540 U.S.
983 (2003).
50
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appropriated can only hope that personal jurisdiction and
venue exist in a district54 within a minimalist circuit.
III. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND USE
The Copyright Act vests ownership of a copyright in a
work in the person or people who are the authors of it.55 “As
a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the
work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”56
Applying this rule to the practice of law establishes that
the attorney is presumptively the author and will be
recognized as the owner of the resulting copyright.57 There
are three things that could alter this conclusion, however.
First, in appropriate circumstances, the person who pays for a
work to be produced may be considered the author under the
“work-made-for-hire” provision of the Copyright Act.58
Second, for some works, someone in addition to the attorney
may be able to claim ownership as a “joint work” under the
54

Subject matter jurisdiction for a claim of copyright infringement is
exclusively in the U.S. District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). See
generally 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[A].
55
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). For the purpose of the analysis in
this paper, it is assumed that the work-product in question was created on
or after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the current Copyright Act.
See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 102, 90 Stat. 2541,
2598–99 (1976). The ownership determination for works created before
1978 is more complicated as the transitory sections of the 1976 Act must
be evaluated. See generally, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[B].
56
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989).
57
It is important to distinguish between the copyright – the set of
rights established to the intangible work of authorship under the
Copyright Act – and a copy of the copyrighted work–the physical
embodiment of the intangible work of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. § 202
(2000). Under most states’ laws, the copy belongs to the client. See Jones
v. C.I.R., 129 T.C. 146, at 154–55 (2007) (citing cases). This article, on
the other hand, addresses the broader question of the ownership and use of
the copyright.
58
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (establishing the employer as the
owner of a work-made-for-hire work) & id. § 101 (defining “work made
for hire”).
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statute.59 Finally, the Code of Professional Conduct must be
evaluated to determine if the rules of practice dictate a
different answer.60 Each of these areas will be addressed in
turn.
A. Are Work-Product Documents “Works
Made for Hire” under the Copyright Act?
Although normally the person who fixes an expression is
its author under the Copyright Act, this rule is changed for a
“work made for hire.”61 A work will be one made for hire if
either:
(1)

(2)

[the] work [is] prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
[the] work [is] specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation,
as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work
made for hire.62

As a practical matter, attorney-prepared documents would
have to qualify as having been created pursuant to
employment as the second test—a specially ordered or
commissioned work —does not often apply to the work of an
attorney. Congress specified a list of nine categories of works
59

See id. § 201(a) (establishing a co-ownership for jointly produced
works) & id. § 101 (defining “joint work”).
60
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/home.html [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
61
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
62
Id. § 101.
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that could be specially ordered or commissioned as a work
made for hire: (1) collective works, (2) parts of audiovisual
works, (3) translations, (4) supplementary works, (5)
compilations, (6) instructional texts, (7) tests, (8) answers to
tests, or (9) atlases.63 A work fixed by a non-employee that is
not in these nine categories cannot be a work made for hire.64
Most of these statutory examples—specifically number
two, three, six, seven, eight and nine—do not describe the
kinds of materials attorneys normally create. Consequently, if
the specially ordered or commissioned category is to apply,
the work must be a collective work, a supplementary work or
a compilation.
Very few works of lawyers qualify as a “collective work”
which requires that “a number of contributions, constituting
separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled
into a collective whole.”65 The illustrative examples given in
the definition are “periodical issue[s], antholog[ies and]
encyclopedia[s].”66 In distinction, a lawyer’s work-product is
a unified whole; indeed, even where multiple attorneys work
on the same product, the individual contributions rarely stand
on their own as articles in a magazine do. Once the work is
done, a single work exists, not a collection of smaller pieces.
Similarly the definition Congress provided for a
supplementary work (found within the definition of a work
made for hire) indicates that it must be a “secondary adjunct”
to another author’s work such as a forward.67 This does not
describe a contract, brief, or other typical work-product.
Finally, a work-product is not usually a compilation as
that requires the “assembl[y] of preexisting materials . . .”68
Although there might be some pre-existing material
contained within a work-product, most of the typical work63

Id. § 101 (2000) (defining “work made for hire”).
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
738 (1989) (acknowledging that a sculpture could not be a specially
ordered or commissioned work as it was not one of the nine categories).
65
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining collective work).
66
Id.
67
Id. (defining “supplementary work” within the definition of “work
made for hire”).
68
Id. (defining “compilation”).
64
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product is created specifically for the matter at hand. An
exception to this would be a fill-in-the-blank type of form
contract or other document where no drafting is done. If all
the attorney does is to fill in the name, it could be a
compilation under the statute. In this case, however, the other
requirement of the statute for a specially ordered or
commissioned work—that “the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire” 69 —is rarely satisfied.
Although many attorneys use written retainer agreements,
they are unlikely to address the copyright ownership issue in
a way that would vest ownership in the client.70
Consequently, for an attorney’s work-product to belong to
anyone other than the attorney, it will have to qualify as one
produced during employment. To do this, the work had to be
prepared by an employee as that term is understood under the
common law. 71 The Court expressly held that this
determination is one of federal rather than state common
law.72 In defining an employee, the Court relied heavily on
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY.73
The RESTATEMENT lists eight criteria that need to be
evaluated to determine if someone is an employee (in a
master-servant relationship under the RESTATEMENT):
69

Id. (defining “work made for hire”).
It is also important for a fill-in-the-blank document to evaluate
whether there is sufficient creativity contained for it to be an original
work of authorship at all. See infra § II.B.2.
71
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
740–41 (1989).
72
See id. at 740 (“Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather
than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given
the Act’s express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by
broadly preempting state statutory and common-law copyright
regulation.”).
73
See id. at 740, 751–52 and nn.18–31. It is unclear if the Court
would similarly rely on the Third Restatement as its definition of an
employee is much less specific. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
7.07(3)(a) (2006). This imprecision is somewhat ameliorated by the
comments to the section. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07,
cmt. f. The comments in the Third Restatement seem to set forth a similar
set of considerations as were found in the section in the Second.
70
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(a) the extent of control which, by the
agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by
a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular
occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in
business.74
While some attorneys can satisfy these criteria in relation to
their client—in-house corporate counsel, for example—it is
clear that most do not.75 It is the attorney, not the client, that
controls the details of the work.76 Attorneys are clearly
74

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
The analysis here is of the relationship between the individual
attorney and the client. Many attorneys who are in private practice are
employees of their law firms. If this is true, the law firm would most
likely be the owner of the copyright in the work-product rather than the
individual attorney.
76
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2)(a). Cf. MODEL
RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.2, cmts. [1] & [2] (2007) (“Clients normally
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the
means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect
75
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“engaged in a distinct occupation,” 77 work as a specialist
without direct supervision,78 and require a high level of skill79
to accomplish the client’s task. The next three factors also
disfavor the private practice attorney being an employee as
the work will most typically be done at the attorney’s office80
and the relationship and payment will most typically be taskoriented rather than salary81 (without an expectation that the
attorney will be an employee of the client82). Generally, an
attorney’s clients are not also lawyers.83 The final factor—
whether the client is in business84 —is the only one that is
often true as many attorneys do represent businesses rather
than individuals. It would seem unlikely that this factor, alone,
is sufficient to alter the conclusion that attorneys are not, in
general, employees of their clients. Consequently, the client
cannot claim that the copyright belongs to the client under the
work made for hire provision of the copyright act.
The consequence of this conclusion can be seen in the
Smith hypothetical. Even if Onetime gave Howard the
contract that had been drafted by David, that did not allow
Howard to reuse it as it is David, not Onetime, that owns the
copyright. The right to reproduce the contract, or make
modifications to it, belongs to David.85
B. Are Work-Product Documents Joint Works
Under the Copyright Act?
The Copyright Act recognizes that more that one person
can collaborate to create an expressive work—a “joint work”

to technical, legal and tactical matters.”).
77
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 220(2)(b).
78
See id. § 220(2)(c).
79
See id. § 220(2)(d).
80
See id. § 220(2)(e).
81
See id. §§ 220(2)(f) & 220(2)(g).
82
See id. § 220(2)(i).
83
Cf. § 220(2)(h).
84
See id. § 220(2)(j).
85
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) & (3) (2000). Even though David has this
basic right, the various copyright defenses must still be evaluated. See
infra § IV.

2008

Intellectual Property Rights

21

under the statute.86 Such works belong equally to both
authors and either can control its use.87 As a claim could be
made that the client and the attorney are joint authors of the
attorney’s work-product,88 the standards for being a coauthor
must be examined. These standards are not insignificant,
however, and lead to the conclusion that work-products are
not often the result of joint authorship. For a work to be a
joint work under the Copyright Act, two requisites must be
met: the purported joint authors must be authors under the
copyright act and they must each intend to work together to
prepare a joint work.89
As discussed in section III.B above, to be an author, one
has to fix a work of sufficient creativity to constitute a work
of authorship. In the case of a joint work, each of the
collaborators must do this.90 This is rarely true for an
attorney’s work-product as the one who does the “fixing”—
and almost all of the creation of the expression—is the lawyer.
At most, the client may contribute some or all of the ideas
that underlie the document or may offer editing suggestions.
Neither is sufficient to make the client an author. 91 In the
hypotheticals, it is unlikely that any of the clients participated
in any meaningful way with their respective attorneys to
produce the documents.
86

See id. § 101 (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”).
87
See id. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of
copyright in the work.”). See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13
F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Each author as co-owner has the right
to use or to license the use of the work, subject to an accounting to the
other co-owners for any profits.”).
88
The author could not find a reported case where such a claim was
made. The closest case may be Khandji v. Keystone Resorts Management,
Inc., 140 F.R.D. 697 (D. Colo. 1992), where the court acknowledged that
the attorney’s work-product was the appropriate subject of a copyright
claim. See id. at 700.
89
See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d at 1069.
90
See id. at 1070–71 & the cases cited at 1070, n.8.
91
See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that an actress’s contribution of the research that was used to write a play
and her suggestions about incidentals associated with the play were
insufficient to make her a coauthor).
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Similarly, it is unlikely that the necessary intent was
present. For a joint work, all of the joint authors must
individually intend to produce a joint work.92 In the
hypotheticals, such mutual intent seems to be lacking.
Consequently, a work-product does not constitute a joint
work.
C. Do the Ethics of Practice Dictate Who Owns
the Work-Product or How It Can Be Used?
Anyone who practices law knows that a primary
consideration in all decision-making is the dictates of the
rules of practice.93 These rules—or more accurately, the
version of them adopted in the jurisdiction in which the
attorney is practicing94—establish the framework of the
attorney’s obligation to his or her client and society. Not
surprisingly, the MODEL RULES address the issue of the rights
to a work-product, but fail to provide any clear guidance
about who owns the work-product of an attorney. The
relevant rule as proposed by the ABA states: “Upon
termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
such as . . . surrendering papers and property to which the
client is entitled . . . The lawyer may retain papers relating to
the client to the extent permitted by other law.” 95 But is a
92

See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d at 1068–69.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 60. Almost every state has
adopted some version of the MODEL RULES as their ethical code. See id.
(listing
dates
of
adoption),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html.
94
Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d) (“The lawyer
may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other
law.”) with ARIZ. ETHICS RULES ER 1.16(d) (“The lawyer may retain
documents reflecting work performed for the client to the extent permitted
by other law only if retaining them would not prejudice the client's
rights.”). An even greater difference is found in the Massachusetts version
of the rule where the final sentence in Rule 1.16(d) has been omitted and a
new subsection (e) has been added. See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.16, available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc1.htm
(2003).
95
MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d).
93
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client “entitled” to the attorney’s work-product or do “other
law[s]” allow the attorney to maintain it? Equally, are the
rules of practice addressing ownership of copyright rights or
are they just addressing the possession and use of a copy?96
1. The Rules of Practice Cannot Transfer
Ownership of the Copyright to the Client
The Copyright Act vests initial ownership of the
copyright in the author. 97 As discussed above, unless the
lawyer is a common law employee of the client, this means
that lawyer is the initial copyright owner. Consequently,
absent an express written agreement to the contrary, 98 the
client does not own the copyright and cannot, therefore, use
ownership as the basis for a claim of entitlement under the
rules of practice. Further, the rules of practice of a state
cannot alter this rule and establish that the client owns the
copyright because of the limitation on the involuntary transfer
of a copyright that is contained within the Act:
When an individual author's ownership of a
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, has not previously been
transferred voluntarily by that individual
author, no action by any governmental body or
other official or organization purporting to
seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights
of ownership with respect to the copyright, or
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright,
96

The Copyright Act expressly distinguishes between the “copyright”
and a “copy.” See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). The copyright is associated
with the rights established by the Act to do such things as reproduce the
work while the copy is associated with a physical, material object on
which the work is recorded. See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239–
40 (5th Cir. 1982).
97
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
98
See id. §§ 204(a) & 101 (defining “transfer of copyright
ownership”). Any transfer of the ownership of a copyright, whether by
assignment, mortgage or exclusive license, requires a written and signed
document. See id. § 204(a).
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shall be given effect under this title, except as
provided under title 11.99
Consequently, any rule contained in a state’s Code of
Professional Conduct that purports to transfer an attorney’s
copyright would be preempted.100
2. The Rules of Practice May Be Able to Provide the
Client with Limited Rights to Use the Work Product
The limitation against a state mandated transfer of the
copyright does not apply, however, if all that it seeks to
transfer is a nonexclusive right to use the copyrighted work as
99

Id. § 201(e). The reference to title 11 is a reference to a Bankruptcy
Court’s power to seize a copyright as an asset of a bankrupt. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (2000).
Even without this limitation expressed in the Act, it is highly
unlikely that state adopted rules of practice could designate the client as
the owner of the copyright in an attorney’s work-product as such a rule
would likely be preempted under the Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), decision. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme
Court established that a state rule that “regulate the use of . . . intellectual
property in any manner . . . inconsistent with federal law” would be
preempted. Id. at 156 (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
U.S. 257, 262 (1979)). The Copyright Act designates the actual author of
the work as the owner of the rights, based on a carefully crafted
congressional compromise. See. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 121, as reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“The work-made-for-hire provisions
of this bill represent a carefully balanced compromise . . .”). A state is not
allowed to alter the legislatively established balance. Consequently, the
attorney, not the client, owns the copyright.
See generally, Ralph D. Clifford, The Federal Circuit’s Cruise to
Uncharted Waters: How Patent Protection for Algorithms and Business
Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual Property Protection,
73 TEMP. L. REV. 1241 (2000).
100
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739 (“The purpose of [17 U.S.C. § 201(e)] is to
reaffirm the basic principle that the United States copyright of an
individual author shall be secured to that author, and cannot be taken
away by any involuntary transfer.”). Cf. Advance Magazine Publishers,
Inc. v. Leach, 466 F.Supp. 2d 628, 635–36 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that
state adverse possession law has been preempted by the Copyright Act
and cannot be deemed to be a transfer by “operation of law”).
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Section 201(e) only applies to transfers of ownership.101 The
definition of “transfer of copyright ownership” in Section 101
of the act expressly excludes “a nonexclusive license.” 102
Because nonexclusive rights to use a copyrighted work are
not transfers under the Act, involuntary transfers of
nonexclusive rights can be mandated; indeed, copyright law
has developed a judicial doctrine known as an implied license
that does exactly that.
The implied license doctrine has been expressly accepted
in most circuits.103 As the rule has been set forth by the
Seventh Circuit:
an implied nonexclusive license has been
granted when (1) a person (the licensee)
requests the creation of a work, (2) the creator
(the licensor) makes that particular work and
delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and
(3)
the
licensor
intends
that
the
licensee-requestor copy and distribute his
work.104
The three requirements of this rule are probably met by
an attorney’s work-product—it is developed for the client,105
is copied and distributed either to or on behalf of the client,
101

See, e.g., John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props.,
Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003).
102
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “transfer of copyright
ownership”).
103
See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc. 322
F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003); Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir.
1998); Lowe v. Loud Records, 126 F. App’x. 545, 547 (3d Cir. 2005) (not
precedential); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d
505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002); Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Serv., Inc.,
128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997); I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768,
775 (7th Cir. 1996); Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th
Cir. 1990); Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 991–92 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
104
I.A.E., Inc., 74 F.3d at 776. This statement of the law is consistent
with the rule adopted by most circuits. See cases cited in note 103, supra.
105
Even though the client probably does not request the specific
document to be created, i.e., a brief supporting summary judgment, the
client does request the representation which, in turn, leads to the
development of the necessary documents.
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prohibited the client from doing so.111 Although no reported
case could be found that so held, a similar implied license to
continue using an attorney’s work-product as that work was
originally intended would be a probable conclusion were the
matter to be litigated. It is fair to assume, therefore, that once
the document has been produced, the client has the right to
use it. Consequently, in the apropos Henry King hypothetical,
any document Henry completed must be made available to
Welbuilt so that it can use it as the parties originally intended.
This would be true even if Henry has not been fully
compensated as Welbuilt’s nonexclusive license to use the
documents will not be abrogated for non-payment as that is
not generally seen as terminating the license.112
(b) Modifying or Reusing the Work-Product
If the work-product is used exactly as intended and is not
modified by either the client or the client’s replacement
counsel, the implied license doctrine would almost certainly
prevent the use from being considered infringing. The
situation becomes much more complicated, however, if the
original work is modified (which would include completing a
draft document) or if it is used in a way that is different than
what was originally intended.
In Oddo v. Ries,113 for example, an author was deemed to
have created an implied license when he submitted an article
to a partnership he had formed with the defendant for
ultimate publication as part of a book.114 Subsequently, being
dissatisfied with the plaintiff Oddo’s efforts, the defendant
Ries hired another writer who finished the book which
included modifying the material that Oddo had submitted.115
Ries then published the book.116 The court held that this was
111

See id.
Cf. Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
obligation to pay royalties a covenant not a condition thus not constituting
a material breach).
113
743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984).
114
See id. at 634.
115
See id. at 632.
116
See id.
112
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improper, stating that “the implied license to use the articles
in the manuscript does not give [the defendant] the right to
use the articles in any work other than the manuscript
itself.”117 In other words, the implied license gave the right to
use the work as submitted, but did not allow changes to be
made to the submitted work.
If the Oddo rule could simply be applied to the use of an
attorney’s work-product, the analysis would not be difficult—
no changes can be made. For example, if the original attorney
wrote a memorandum in support of summary judgment,
under Oddo, it would be improper for a later counsel to
modify the memorandum into a memorandum addressing
judgment as a matter of law and would certainly be improper
to use it to develop an appellate brief. Similarly, if the
attorney drafts a contract for one agreement, it would be
improper for the client to modify it for another. Unfortunately,
things in copyright law are rarely that simple.118
To begin with, complexity is introduced by the problem
of determining what the actual terms of the nonexclusive
license are as the typical attorney and client will not have
expressed any agreement concerning each party’s respective
intellectual property rights.119 From the perspective of the
copyright law, a licensee (client) only obtains the specific
copyright rights that the licensor (attorney) intended to
transfer. 120 Where no intent is expressed—in words or in
conduct—no rights transfer, effectively requiring implied
licenses to be narrowly construed. From the perspective of
the rules of practice, however, the licensor (attorney) is under
117

Id. at 634.
In addition to the complexity suggested by the implied terms to
the nonexclusive license being discussed in this section, the consequences
of the fair use defense, discussed in section IV below, must also be
evaluated.
119
Most times, the nonexclusive rights are created by implication
based on the parties’ conduct rather than on their words. See Lulirama
Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broadcast Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir.
1997) (“When the totality of the parties' conduct indicates an intent to
grant . . . permission [to use a copyrighted work], the result is a legal
nonexclusive license. . ..” (quotation marks omitted)).
120
See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d
14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976).
118
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an affirmative obligation to “take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests . . .”121
This could easily cause a court to broadly construe the
implied license.
The considerations that might lead a court to broadly
construe the license are re-enforced further by the “Implied
Grant of Collateral Rights” doctrine.122 The doctrine requires
a license to be interpreted broadly enough that its purpose can
be achieved.123 For example, the doctrine would give a
licensee the right to distribute records that were made
pursuant to a license to record them even where the original
license was silent about distribution.124
When the collateral rights doctrine is considered together
with the rules of practice, it is likely that a court would make
a broad interpretation of the nonexclusive license.
Consequently, at a minimum, the license likely includes the
right for the client to complete the document being prepared
so that it can be used as intended. After all, the rules of
practice express a strong preference in favor of the client’s
continued use of the work-product material; indeed, it would
not be surprising if a court deemed the rules as part of the
implied contract between the attorney and client. Beyond
merely completing the document, because the basic
relationship between the attorney and client calls for the
attorney to represent the client in a particular matter, the
collateral rights grant would seem to cover additional uses of
the work-product within the same matter.125
121

MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d). See id. cmt. 9 (“Even if
the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take
all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client.”).
122
See Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors Guild,
Ltd., 728 F.Supp. 975, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The term “Implied Grant of
Collateral Rights” appears to owe its origin to Professor Nimmer as
presented in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[C].
123
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[C].
124
Cf. Royal v. Radio Corp. of America, No. Civ. 65-391, 1955 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4195, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1955).
125
Of course, if the relationship between the attorney and client does
not match the typical ones being discussed in this article, the results of the
analysis would differ. If, for example, the attorney is hired only to write a
particular document, rather than engage in a generalized representation of
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As a consequence, the most probable outcome is that the
client will be able to use the work-product throughout the
conclusion of the matter for which the attorney was originally
hired. This, of course, assumes that the attorney doesn’t
terminate the license, if he or she has that right. This requires
an exploration of when licenses can be terminated.

(c) Terminating an Implied License
The final factor that can complicate the analysis of the
effect of an implied license on an attorney’s work-product is
whether the license is terminable. Under copyright law, a
license that is not supported by consideration from the
licensee (client) is revocable.126
Obviously, therefore, if the attorney has been fully
compensated for developing the work-product, the implied
license could not be terminated, leaving the client free to use
it in accordance with the implied terms of the license. Where
compensation has not been paid, as at-will employment does
not constitute consideration,127 and an attorney’s employment
by a client is at will by the rules of practice,128 the
nonexclusive license granted to the client to use the
attorney’s work-product would be revocable.
the client, the client’s argument for a broad license is weaker. An example
of this would be where the lawyer directly representing the client hires
another attorney to write a memorandum of law.
126
See Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574 n.12 (4th Cir.
1994); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02[B][5].
127
See Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that “[c]onsideration for a promise, by either the employee or the
employer in an at-will employment, cannot be dependent on a period of
continued employment. Such a promise would be illusory because it fails
to bind the promisor who always retains the option of discontinuing
employment in lieu of performance.”). See generally 17B C.J.S.
Contracts § 441 (1999) (“Contracts of employment, whose only
consideration is the services to be performed thereunder and which are
silent as to duration, are terminable at will . . .”).
128
See MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(a)(3) & id. cmt. 4 (“A
client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without
cause . . .”).
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Where a license is revocable, the procedure the licensor
(attorney) uses to terminate it is defined by state contract
law.129 This will generally empower the licensor to terminate
it at will, although some states have begun to require a
reasonable amount of notice to be provided before
termination.130
The ability of an attorney to terminate the nonexclusive
license will differ depending on the contract law of the
jurisdiction. If the state follows the more traditional rule that
allows termination with minimal notice, the attorney could
inform the client of the revocation which would then require
the client to stop using the work-product immediately. If, on
the other hand, as is much more probable, the state requires
reasonable notice to terminate,131 the client would maintain
the right to continue using the work-product for at least some
time, presumably the amount of time that it would take the
client to replace it with a new one. In either case, though, the
client’s ability to continue using the work-product as a source
129

See Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999); Korman v.
HBC Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1999); Invessys, Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Companies, Ltd., 369 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2004); NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 11.10[B]. But see Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580,
585 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that federal law–17 U.S.C. § 203–controls
the termination of copyright licenses). But cf. Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23
F.Supp.2d 741 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that the City was entitled to a
reasonable period of time after notice before the license could be revoked
without doing an Erie analysis).
Although state law controls the termination of a license in most
circuits, the Copyright Act also provides an absolute right to terminate a
license, generally after thirty-five years. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2000).
As a practical matter, however, for an attorney’s work-product, the value
is likely to be absent after that long of a period. If a work-product license
is terminated, therefore, it is likely to be under the provisions of state law.
130
See, e.g., 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 439 (1999) (“If there is nothing
in the nature or the language of a contract for an indefinite period to
indicate that it is perpetual, the courts will interpret the contract to be
terminable at will . . . Some courts require, however, that such contracts
be terminated only on reasonable notice.”).
131
For the license between an attorney and client, it is likely that
states would adopt this reasonable notice requirement because of the
dictates contained within the rules of practice that an attorney take
reasonable steps to protect the client when the employment relationship
terminates. See MODEL RULES, supra note 60, R. 1.16(d).
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for newly developed ones—transforming a summary
judgment memorandum into an appellate brief, for
example132—would be terminated.
When applied to the hypotheticals, only Henry King
would have a right to terminate the nonexclusive license. In
both the Brenda Maxim and David Smith hypotheticals, the
attorneys were compensated, making the license irrevocable.
Their clients, therefore, have a continuing right to use the
works, only limited as discussed in the two proceeding
subsections. Henry King, on the other hand, would have to do
a work-product by work-product analysis to determine if he
could terminate the nonexclusive license. If, for example, the
work-product in question could not practically be replaced—
an executed contract or time-critical court document, for
example—the client would maintain a right to use them. But
where the document can be replaced, Henry’s termination
would be effective and the client’s right to use the document
would cease.
IV. THE COPYRIGHT DEFENSE OF FAIR USE
The analysis of copyright rights is never complete without
examining the “fair use” defense.133 Fair use constitutes an
affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim.134
Unfortunately, an easy comprehension of the defense is

132

Again, here, it is important to remember the distinction that
copyright law makes between the idea and the expression of it that
comprise a work of authorship. See Section II, supra. The client,
replacement counsel, or anyone else, for that matter, are free to examine
the work-product and extract from it the ideas that underlie it. Thus, for
example, the new attorney could use the original document as a source for
the relevant cases and statutes that apply to the client’s matter. Similarly,
the legal theory under which the original counsel developed the case
could be used without worries about copyright infringement. What is
protected by copyright is how the original attorney expressed the legal
theory, not the theory itself.
133
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
134
See id. § 106 (“Subject to sections 107 . . . , the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following . . .”).
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unlikely as it is both open-ended and imprecise.135 The statute
dictates that four specific factors “shall [be] include[d]” in the
evaluation,136 but the definition of “includ[e]” that is
contained within the statute indicates these four factors are
“illustrative and not limitative.”137 Consequently, although an
analysis of the four statutory factors must always be done,
there is nothing to stop a court from defining and applying
some new fifth rule.138
Unfortunately, the four primary considerations are not
exercises in elucidative legislative drafting.139 According to
the Copyright Act, fair use is found based primarily on:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted
work.140

Each of these statutory factors will be examined next,
followed by a discussion of whether the courts are likely to
135

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
136
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
137
Id. § 101 (defining “including”). Normal statutory interpretation
reaches the opposite result and limits the general term to those items
specified in the list. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2007)
138
Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(“[T]ransformative works . . . lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright . . .).
139
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (“no real definition of the concept [of fair use]
has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason,
no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts.”).
140
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).

34

Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Vol. 3

find a fifth factor outside of the statutory framework when
examining work-products. After this discussion, they will be
applied collectively to the hypothetical work-product
documents.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use of the
Work-Product
This “purpose of the use” statutory factor evaluates how
the copyrighted work was used by the appropriator.141 In
effect, it evaluates whether there is a high enough societal
gain achieved by the appropriation that requiring the author
to forego his or her normal compensation is appropriate.
Three types of uses are apropos to work-products:
1. Advancing the Public Interest
The statute specifies that uses “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research
[are] not an infringement of copyright.” 142 A work-product
document being used in litigation would seem to at least
touch on the sort of purpose that Congress indicated is more
likely to be fair use. As with the categories expressly stated,
litigation advances democracy, a core value to be preserved
by appropriate application of the fair use defense as
imprecisely described as “criticism, comment, [and] news
reporting” in the statute.143
141

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
Id. § 107 (emphasis added). Although this sentence from the
statute makes it appear as if these types of uses are absolutely allowed, the
next sentence makes it clear that all of the factors must be examined, see
id.; indeed, these uses have been used by the courts to clarify the first of
the statutory factors contained in Section 107(1). See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“[T]he
examples enumerated in § 107 . . . give some idea of the sort of activities
the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances.” (quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
143
See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America v. Handgun Control Fed’n of Ohio,
15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The scope of the fair use doctrine is
wider when the use relates to issues of public concern.”); Sega Enters. Ltd.
142
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2. Creating a Transformative Work
A highly determinative factor in evaluating the purpose of
the use is whether the copying and use of the original work
resulted in a new work that:
adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; ... in other
words, whether and to what extent the new
work is “transformative.” . . . [T]he more
transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use.144
In other words, the “copyrightable expression in the original
work [must be] used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings . . .”145 The closer the copy is to the original
expression, the less likely it is to be fair use.
3. Using a Work Non-Commercially
A commercial use of another’s copyrighted work raises a
rebuttable presumption that the use is not fair.146 “The crux of
the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.”147 As with all other fair use
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Public benefit
need not be direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use
serves a public interest.”). Cf. Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Where strict enforcement of the rights of a
copyright holder . . . would conflict with . . . some other important
societal value, courts should be free to fashion an appropriate fair use
exemption.”).
144
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
145
Castle Rock Entm’t. v. Carol Publ’g. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142
(2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
146
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,471 U.S. at 562.
147
Id.
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factors, however, the presumption of unfair use can be
overcome where the other fair use considerations outweigh
the commercial nature of the use.148
B. Nature of the Work-Product
The “nature of the work” statutory factor requires
consideration of the kind of work that was copied.149 Two
relevant aspects of work-products merit discussion:
1. Work Within Core of Copyright
The essence of this factor addresses whether the
copyrighted work is considered within the “core” of works
that obtain copyright protection. 150 The Supreme Court has
indicated that “some works are closer to the core of intended
copyright protection than others, with the consequence that
fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works
are copied.”151
The works that are at the core of copyright are those that
required the most creativity in their creation or were
generated in an expectation of returning a profit.152
Consequently, works of fiction are less likely to support a
finding of fair use that works of non-fiction153 as are works
that were expressed because of their inherent economic
value.154

148

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
150
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
151
Id.
152
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
153
See id.
154
See id. A copyrighted novel returns a reward to the author because
people are interested in obtaining and reading the novel itself. This differs
from a work-product as it is rarely of intrinsic value; instead, the value
comes from its ability to achieve a particular legal result.
149
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2. Unpublished Work
Another relevant consideration in evaluating the nature of
the work is whether it is published.155 When a work has not
been published, a finding of fair use is much less likely.156
“Publication” is a term-of-art within copyright law. As
the statute defines it, “‘[p]ublication’ is the distribution of
copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”157 Very few workproducts meet this statutory definition.
C. Amount of the Work-Product Used
The “amount copied” statutory factor evaluates the
quantity of the copyrighted work that is used in the new
work.158 “As a general matter, as the amount of the
copyrighted material that is used increases, the likelihood that
the use will constitute a ‘fair use’ decreases.” 159 It is
important to recognize, however, that there are no
absolutes—copying all of an expression might be fair,160 just
as copying a small, but fundamental part of the expression
might not be.161 Consequently, both the quantity and the
quality of what is copied must be evaluated.
D. Effect of Work-Product Copying on the
Marketplace
The final “effect of copying” factor evaluates the impact
that the type of copying done would have on the copyright

155

See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
554 (1985).
156
See id.
157
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “publication”).
158
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000).
159
Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003).
160
See Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir.
1998).
161
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
564–65 (1985).
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owner’s overall market for the work.162 This factor is, without
doubt, the most important of the four statutory factors.163 At
the extreme, copying that destroys an author’s ability to
obtain reasonable value for the work is unfair.
As this analysis is done, it is necessary to have an
appropriately broad perspective. As the Supreme Court held:
It requires courts to consider not only the
extent of market harm caused by the particular
actions of the alleged infringer, but also
whether unrestricted and widespread conduct
of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . .
would result in a substantially adverse impact
on the potential market for the original. The
enquiry must take account not only of harm to
the original but also of harm to the market for
derivative works.164
In other words, the analysis requires that an assumption is
made that all other people who are similarly situated with the
appropriator—other attorneys, for the purpose of this paper—
are also copying the work in a similar way. It is the overall
consequence this copying causes that forms the basis for the
effect of copying factor analysis.
Additionally, Congress required two evaluations of the
effects, one on “the potential market for” the copyrighted
work and the other on the “value of” it. 165 Consequently,
while the analysis must determine the economic impact on
the copyright owner, it must also determine the other, noneconomic consequences of the copying.166 An example of this
can be found in Weissmann v. Freeman.167 In the case, the
defendant copied some of the plaintiff’s academic work.168
162

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
164
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
165
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
166
See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342
F.3d 191, 202 (3d Cir. 2003).
167
868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
168
See id. at 1326.
163
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The court determined that the effect of copying factor did not
favor a fair use finding despite the lack of economic impacts
as the appropriation would “create[] a distinct disincentive for
[the plaintiff] to continue to research and publish in the field
of nuclear medicine” 169 The district court was expressly
criticized for focusing on the “dollars received, rather than
upon the realities of promotion and tenure in an academic
setting.”170
E. The Fifth Factor—Legal System
Considerations
As discussed above, the four statutory factors are not
exclusive and the courts can examine any other consideration
that is relevant to determining whether the appropriation was
fair. 171 When examining fair use in the context of a workproduct document, a probable fifth factor exists: the needs of
the legal system itself. While, to a certain extent, the “public
interest” aspect of the purpose of the use factor addresses
similar considerations, the fact that an attorney’s work is so
central to the administration of justice magnifies the
importance of the work to society, with a correspondingly
higher probability of a fair use finding. The fair use defense,
after all, has an important purpose of limiting an author’s
copyright rights when this is necessary to advance
democracy.172 Work-product documents, particularly those
that are used within the judicial system, have this
consequence.173 Without the pleadings, briefs, and other
work-products, it is unclear how a system of justice could
function.

169

Id.
Id.
171
See discussion in the beginning of Section IV, supra; Haberman v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F.Supp. 201, 214 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding
that appropriator’s good faith is relevant to a fair use analysis).
172
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
173
Cf., e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145–46
(1994).
170
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F. Application to the Fair Use Hypotheticals
In this final part of the section, the fair use defense will be
applied to the copying that occurred in the two relevant
hypotheticals. This is necessary as a fair use analysis requires
a case-by-case application of the facts to the law.174 Thus, the
Brenda Maxim hypothetical will be considered first and the
David Smith hypothetical will follow. The third hypothetical
involving Henry King will not be discussed in this section as
it involves issues of implied licenses rather than fair use.175
1. Brenda Maxim Hypothetical—
Litigation Work-Products
The Brenda Maxim hypothetical shows copying by three
separate appropriators: the court, the attorney in the second
case, and the research system. Each will be discussed in turn.
(a) Court Copying of Her Expression
The court’s use of Brenda’s expression, even without
attribution, is likely to be considered fair use. The analysis:
(1) Purpose of the Use
This factor largely favors fair use. First, the judge’s use of
Brenda’s expression was not commercial. Neither the judge
nor the legal system receive compensation because of the
unattributed quote. Second, the purposes of the quote serves
to advance the public interest as definitions of the law in
court opinions are critical to democracy in a common law
country and they further serve the educational function of
explaining the law. Slightly contradicting a fair use finding,
on the other hand, is that the quote is not a transformative use
of Brenda’s work-product as the court opinion would closely
match the brief. Overall, the first two positive considerations,
174

See, e.g., Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d
Cir. 1992).
175
For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Section III.C.2.c, supra.
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particularly the public interest served, seem to outweigh the
one negative, however. This factor favors fair use, therefore.
(2) Nature of the Work
The nature of the work factor, too, generally favors fair
use. As a work of non-fiction, a fair use finding is more likely
established than it would be for a fictional one.176 This
finding is made even more probable by the law being the
subject matter of the brief. On the other hand, the work is not
a published work, at least as that term is defined in the
Copyright Act.177 An unpublished work is significantly less
likely to support a fair use finding.178
In balancing these contradictory considerations, there are
two reasons why the balance is likely to tip in favor of fair
use. First, there is a significant chance that the courts would
not use the statutory definition of publication for a fair use
analysis as the work’s distribution out of the control of the
author seems more apropos to fair use analysis than the
traditional copyright publication analysis.179 Second, even
though the work was not “published,” it was distributed by
the author into a forum that maintains public records. Both of
these increase the probability that this factor favors fair use.

176

See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342
F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003).
177
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “publication” as “the
distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”).
178
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
554 (1985).
179
Cf. American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir.
1956).
Historically, publication was the time when federal copyright
protection became operative. See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999). This changed with the
adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act. See note 11, supra with
accompanying text. For a brief discussion of the history of “publication”
under the Copyright Acts, see generally RayMing Chang, “Publication"
Does Not Really Mean Publication: the Need to Amend the Definition of
Publication in the Copyright Act, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 225, 226–31 (2005).
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(3) Amount Copied
Of the four statutory factors, this is the one that leans
most strongly against a fair use finding. The most significant
portion of the brief was the sections that defined both the
Rule Against Perpetuities and ERISA and clarified their
interrelationship. Copying the core of the brief disfavors a
fair use finding.180
(4) Effect of Copying on Brenda’s Market
The court’s use of the quote is unlikely to have a
significant effect on Brenda’s marketplace for her brief. First,
there is no real economic market for briefs after their use in
the case for which they were written. Although a submitted
brief may sometimes be used in academia to study the subject
briefed,181 monetary compensation is not paid. Consequently,
even if every judge quoted attorney’s briefs without
permission, there would be no economic impact on the
attorney.
Although there is a slightly higher impact on the nonmonetary reward the attorney would receive—presumably the
enhanced reputation an attorney would develop by having a
judge publicly acknowledge the attorney’s abilities by using
an approved quotation written by the attorney—the injury
does not stem from copyright rights but from the court’s
failure to attribute the quote to the attorney. This right of
attribution, however, is not protected by the Copyright Act.182
180

See Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205–06 (4th
Cir. 1998); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003).
181
See http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~i385tpd/385tpage.html, at
class 6 (last visited March 31, 2008) (assigning the author’s amicus brief
to a class).
182
The Copyright Act only establishes a right of attribution for
“work[s] of visual art.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000) (protecting an
artist’s right to maintain his or her name on a work of visual art). A “work
of visual art” is “a painting, drawing, print, . . . sculpture, [or] still
photographic image . . .” Id. § 101. A brief is none of these. See also
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)
(holding that a failure to attribute a public domain work to its author does
not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
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Additionally, although Brenda was not given credit for the
quote itself, she would be listed as counsel of record, thus
giving her much of the credit for the case.
Both the monetary and non-monetary analysis reach the
same result: There is no significant impact on Brenda’s
market. This most important factor also favors fair use,
therefore.
(5) The Fifth Factor— Legal System Considerations
The probable fifth factor also strongly favors fair use.
Brenda’s brief was developed with the primary purpose of
influencing a judge to render a favorable decision. This, of
course, is how our common law system develops the law.183
Disallowing a judge to quote from a brief without the
permission of the brief’s author would seem to serve as a
major impediment in the functioning of the legal system.
Consequently, courts are much more likely to consider brief
copying to be fair use.
(6) Conclusion
Three of the four statutory factors favor a finding of fair
use as do the extra-statutory considerations. It is probable,
therefore, that a court would find that the judge’s appropriation of Brenda’s work-product was fair and, consequently,
not a violation of the Copyright Act.184
(b) Other Attorneys Copying Her Expression
The other attorney appropriating Brenda’s expression
without permission is less likely to be a fair use. The analysis:

183

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17–
20 (1973). See generally, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(1881).
184
Although judicial plagiarism is not prevented by the Copyright Act,
it is not suggested that this conduct is appropriate. See ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 1.2 (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
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(1) Purpose of the Use
This factor no longer favors fair use. First, unlike when
the judge appropriated Brenda’s work-product, the second
attorney’s use of it was commercial as the attorney was being
paid for writing the second brief.185
Second, the new brief was not significantly transformative as it was briefing the same legal issues in the same way.
On the other hand, the use does serve a similar educational
and law making purpose as before except that, of course, it is
now being used to influence the development of the law
rather than to announce it. With the educational role
weakened and the commercialization increased, this factor
now tips against fair use.
(2) Nature of the Work
The nature of the work factor’s analysis is the same as
when the judge appropriated Brenda’s expression,186 so it
favors fair use.
(3) Amount Copied
Again, the amount copied analysis is identical to the one
of the court’s use of Brenda’s brief,187 so the factor disfavors
fair use.
(4) Effect on Brenda’s Market
The effect of copying factor differs from the analysis of
the court’s use of the brief. If an attorney who feels
compelled to copy another attorney’s brief on a complicated
issue is not allowed to do so, there is a significant chance that

185

Only if the second attorney was functioning purely as a pro bono
counsel would this not be true. If the attorney received any benefit –
credit towards promotion in a firm’s pro bono program or a salary from
an advocacy group, etc. – the purpose of the use will be tainted with
commercialism.
186
See Section IV.F.1.a.(2), supra.
187
See Section IV.F.1.a.(3), supra.
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more experienced counsel will be retained.188 Of these
consultations, some of them would likely be with attorneys in
Brenda position.189 As a consequence, this factor tips away
from fair use.
(5) The Fifth Factor—
Legal System Considerations
This factor, as when the judge quoted Brenda’s brief,190
favors a fair use finding.
(6) Conclusion
In the case of the second attorney copying Brenda’s brief,
three of the four factors weigh against a fair use finding.
Particularly because the use is commercial without a
countervailing transformation of the copied work,191 a court
is unlikely to determine that the defense has been established.
Consequently, a violation of the Copyright Act most likely
occurred.
(c) Research System Copying Her Expression
A fair use finding is least likely for the research system’s
copying of Brenda’s brief. The analysis of most of the factors
is the same as when the attorney copied the work,192 but the
purpose of the use factor now clearly suggests that the use is
not fair. As research services are not free, their use of the
brief becomes commercial. A commercial use is only fair
where the other fair use factors overcome the author’s normal
188

Cf. MODEL RULES 1.1, cmt. 2 (“Competent representation can also
be provided through the association of a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question.”).
189
A market effect is found if all copyright producers who are
similarly situated would likely lose value. See note 165, supra with
accompanying text.
190
See Section IV.F.1.a.(5), supra.
191
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79
(1994).
192
See Section IV.F.1.b, supra.
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entitlement to compensation.193 This is most likely to be true
where the appropriated work is highly transformed by the
copier,194 something that is not true in this hypothetical as an
exact copy was made.
2. David Smith Hypothetical— Transactional WorkProducts195
The fair use situation changes when non-litigation
documents are analyzed. Overall, the probability of a fair use
finding decreases.
(a) Purpose of the Use
This first factor strongly indicates that Howard’s copying
of and modifications to David’s contract were not fair. First,
unlike a litigation work-product, no strong public interest is
served by its subsequent use as contracts are not generally
shared with the public at large and, consequently, serve no
educational purpose. Second, although names and addresses
may have been changed, the “copyrightable expression in the
original work [was not] used as raw material, transformed in
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights
and understandings,” 196 meaning that no significant
transformation occurred. Finally, the use of the contract by a
competing attorney is a fundamentally commercial use. 197
These three facts establish that the purpose of the use factor
disfavors fair use.
(b) Nature of the Work
As with a litigation work-product, a contract is a work of
non-fiction, thus increasing the chances of a fair use finding.
193

See Campbell, Inc., 510 U.S. at 585.
See id. at 578–79.
195
The facts of this hypothetical can be found in Section I.B, supra.
196
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142
(2d Cir.1998) (quotation marks omitted).
197
Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994).
194

2008

Intellectual Property Rights

47

In distinction with a litigation document, however, a contract
is not distributed into a system that maintains public records.
As a consequence, a contract represents a work that is neither
published nor distributed which generally implies that a fair
use finding is not appropriate.198 Although it is possible that
this statutory factor would be considered to be neutral, most
courts would likely find that it disfavors a fair use finding.
(c) Amount Copied
Again, as the entire contract was copied, this factor
disfavors a fair use finding.
(d) Effect on David’s Market
The market effect of copying such as Howard did in the
hypothetical is likely to adversely affect David’s financial
and reputational markets. Howard, or any other attorney who
is similarly situated, has avoided the necessity of either
referring the matter to a more experience attorney who could
draft the complicated contract or arranging to have a
seasoned mentor assist in the drafting of it. Both of these
impact on the more seasoned attorney’s market.
(e) The Fifth Factor— Legal System Considerations
Unlike a litigation document which has a direct
connection to the public interest in the development of the
law, transactional documents are associated with private
orderings. A contract serves to establish the details of a legal
relationship between its parties, but does not serve the
broader purpose of educating the judge and public about the
definition of the law. Consequently, there is no interest
outside of the four statutory factors that is likely to cause a
court to find fair use.

198

See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
554 (1985).

48

Trends and Issues in Intellectual Property

Vol. 3

(f) Conclusion
None of the factors in the statute favor a fair use finding.
There is no outside consideration that would compel a court
to develop a fifth factor. A finding of fair use, therefore, is
extraordinarily unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
The determination of whether an attorney’s legal rights
have been violated by another’s appropriation of a work
product is not an easy analysis. Most times, the attorney will
need to consider the competing equitable considerations of a
copyright fair use analysis and may have to attempt to divine
the terms of an agreement that were never expressed. Even
after an analysis is done, the conclusion may be unclear and
even contradictory.
As a practical matter, pursuing legal rights may be unwise
outside of a direct appropriation by another attorney or a
commercial enterprise. For other parties, an attorney would
be wise to resolve the issue with due regard for the broader,
public service considerations of the practice of law.

